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Used car dealer liable for selling excessively
damaged car
by John Bartels
In Payne v. Parks Chevrolet, Inc., 458 S.E.2d
716 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina affirmed the verdict of the district court,
holding a dealership liable for the repair costs of a used
vehicle. The appellate court held that the dealership
either knew or should have known that a used truck it
sold was involved in a prior collision resulting in repair
costs exceeding 25 percent of fair market value of the
vehicle.
Investigation shows long history of vehicle
damage
The vehicle in question was a 1986 Ford truck.
The vehicle's Department of Motor Vehicle title history
disclosed a long chain of title, showing it had been
owned by six different parties at various times. Defendant Parks Chevrolet had purchased the vehicle from
Matthew Cain in 1990. At the time of the purchase,
defendant questioned Cain about the vehicle's history.
Cain disclosed that he had purchased the truck from a
dealership specializing in the purchase and resale of
wrecked vehicles and that he had been involved in a
minor accident (costing $250 to $300 to repair).
Parks Chevrolet specifically asked Cain whether the
truck was ever involved in an accident prior to his
purchasing it in which repair costs had exceeded 25
percent of its fair market value. Cain lacked any such
knowledge, and signed a "Damage Disclosure Statement" to that effect.
Plaintiff Payne purchased the vehicle from
defendant in late 1990 for $7000 without a warranty.
Defendant's salesperson represented that Parks
Chevrolet mechanics had inspected the vehicle and
found no mechanical defects. However, defendant failed
to give Payne a damage disclosure statement as was
required, and failed to disclose to Payne its knowledge
of the prior accident involving the vehicle as disclosed
by Cain.
Payne drove the truck for a year, putting over
16,000 miles on the vehicle, when several significant
1995-1996

mechanical difficulties forced him to take the vehicle to
a body shop for inspection. The shop found "multiple
serious problems with the frame and related parts," and
suggested that the damage had been caused by a serious
accident, which an experienced mechanic would have
discovered upon inspection. The body shop further
estimated that the cost of repair would exceed $2700,
which represented approximately 40 percent of the
purchase price of the vehicle. Payne filed suit, alleging
that defendant had sold him the truck without disclosing
that the vehicle had been involved in a prior accident
resulting in damages exceeding 25 percent of the fair
market value of the vehicle, a violation of North
Carolina statute.

Jury finds dealer knew, or should have
known, of extent of damage
A jury found that the Ford truck at the time of
sale to Payne was damaged in a prior accident to the
extent of at least 25 percent of its fair market value; that
Parks Chevrolet either knew, or should have known, of
the extent of that damage; and that Parks Chevrolet
acted with intent to defraud Payne. Defendant filed
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a
new trial. The judge denied those motions, and this
appeal followed.
The defendant argued that plaintiff failed to
present a prima facie case of violation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 20-71.4(a) (1993) and 20-348(a) (1993). Plaintiff
Payne contended that the evidence presented was
sufficient to sustain a violation of both statutes. The
General Statutes of North Carolina section 20-71.4
provide in part:
It shall be unlawful and constitute a misdemeanor for any transferor who knows or reasonably should know that a motor vehicle has been
involved in a collision or other occurrence to the
extent that the cost of repairing that vehicle
exceeds twenty-five percent (25%) of its fair
market value, or that the motor vehicle is, or
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was.., a reconstructed vehicle.., to fail to
disclose that fact in writing to the transferee prior
to transfer of any vehicle up to five model years
old. Failure to disclose any of the above information will also result in civil liability under N.C.
Gen. § Stat. 20-348.
The General Statutes of North Carolina section 20348 impose monetary damages of up to three times
actual damages upon any party who violates N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-71.4 with intent to defraud.

Evidence sufficient to sustain jury verdict
In describing its standard of review, the court of
appeals noted that it must determine whether the
evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient as a matter of law to be
submitted to the jury. The court found the evidence
presented by plaintiff to be sufficient, holding that: 1)
the defendant ignored statements made by the previous
owner (Cain) as to the condition of the truck and signs
of damage to the truck; and 2) the defendant failed to
provide plaintiff with a damage disclosure statement.
The court stated that to prove a violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-71.4, the plaintiff was required to show that:
1) defendant was a transferor;
2) defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the truck had been involved in a collision
resulting in over 25 percent damage in relation to its fair
market value;
3) defendant failed to disclose such fact in writing
to plaintiff prior to transfer;
4) that the vehicle, prior to transfer, was not more
than five model-years-old.
Defendant did not dispute that it was a
transferor, that it failed to make a written disclosure, or
that the truck was under five-years-old. Defendant did
argue that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof in
respect of the second requirement. The court, examining
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
found defendant's position to be without merit.
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cient to show that Parks Chevrolet should have known
of the extent of the damage to the truck. Specifically,
Cain had disclosed to a Parks Chevrolet employee that
he purchased the truck from a seller of wrecked vehicles; stated he did not know whether the vehicle had
ever suffered damage in excess of 25 percent of its fair
market value; and yet despite his lack of knowledge,
was still instructed to sign a Damage Disclosure
Statement on express instructions from defendant's
employee. Other evidence in favor of the jury verdict
was that of the body shop mechanic who inspected the
car and testified as to the extent of the damage and the
strong likelihood that had the car been inspected by an
experienced mechanic, the degree of damage would
have been discovered.

Parks Chevrolet possesses intent to defraud
The court also addressed the extent of any
intent to defraud on the part of the defendant. Intent to
defraud is required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-348 in
order to impose triple damages. Citing Levine v. Parks
Chevrolet, Inc., 331 S.E.2d 747,750 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985), the court stated: "We hold that a transferor who
lacked actual knowledge may still be found to have
intended to defraud and thus may be civilly liable for a
failure to disclose that a vehicle's actual mileage is
unknown. A transferor may not close his eyes to the
truth." The court in Levine had found that defendant
should have reasonably known a vehicle's odometer
reading was incorrect. Finding the present case to be
analogous, the court here likewise held that Parks
Chevrolet should have known of the extent of the
vehicle's damage (regardless of actual knowledge, or
any lack thereof), and that its behavior was therefore
either grossly negligent or in reckless disregard of the
information provided by the vehicle's previous owner.
Accordingly, having determined that plaintiff
sustained his burden of proof, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's order denying a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and upheld the
jury verdict.
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